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Abstract 
 
An opinion poll on a representative sample of Italian citizens suggests that it does. We 
focus on reforms that would lengthen retirement age and /or cut pension benefits. After 
controlling for individual features of the respondent, we find that individuals who are 
more informed about the costs and functioning of the Italian pension system are more 
willing to accept reforms. This result holds also using non-parametric methods, such as 
propensity-score matching.  However, the data also suggest that information is 
endogenous, and jointly determined with policy opinions. We therefore estimate a 
causal effect of information, with joint maximum likelihood and instrumental variables. 
These different methods all confirm a positive and significant causal effect of better 
information on the willingness to accept reforms that reduce the generosity of the 
pension system.  Finally we do not find that exposure to media coverage of pension 
issues significantly improves information, possibly because individuals read newspaper 
articles or watch TV programs on these issues just to confirm their priors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Why is it so difficult to reform the unsustainable and overly generous European pension 
systems? A simple answer is that a majority of elderly European voters wants to gain at 
the expenses of younger or future generations. But this is not fully convincing, as it 
presupposes that voters are egoistic and do not care about their offspring. This paper 
explores the role of a second possible answer:  opposition to pension reform also stems 
from lack of information about the true costs of the pension system, and lack of 
understanding of the consequences of “pay as you go” public pensions.  
 
We study empirically the opinions of a representative sample of Italian citizens about 
the desirability of alternative pension reforms. Lack of information about basic features 
and costs of public pensions is widespread. Our central finding is that better information 
is associated with more willingness to accept reforms. Of course, individual information 
is not random. The correlation between individual information and policy preferences 
could reflect an unobserved common determinant (such as wealth, or family 
background).  Measurement errors may also make information endogenous to policy 
preferences. The main contribution of this paper is to show that, under a range of 
alternative identification assumptions, the estimated correlation reflects a causal effect: 
informed individuals are more willing to accept pension reforms because of their better 
information about the costs and consequences of the pension system.  
 
If valid, this conclusion would have important policy implications. To increase public 
support for pension reforms, governments in countries with large and unsustainable 
public pension systems ought to devote more effort and resources to inform citizens 
about the basic functioning of pay-as-you-go pensions, about its actual costs, and the 
net position of individual contributors.  But media coverage, by itself, may not be 
sufficient to inform citizens.  We find that individuals who have read newspaper articles 
or watched TV debates on pension reform are not better informed than the other 
citizens. Governments who seriously want to improve citizens’ knowledge about the 
consequences of public pensions ought to find other ways to convey information to 
voters.  The concluding section discusses some concrete examples drawing from the 
experience of Sweden.  
 
The implications of our findings go beyond the pension system. A standard assumption 
in political economics is that voters can evaluate the implications of alternative policy 
proposals, and that they know which policy alternatives are in their best interest. The 
empirical results of this paper cast doubts on the validity of this assumption.  Not only 
voters are vastly uninformed, but their lack of information has a systematic impact on 
policy preferences and induces a bias in favour of the status quo. Whatever determines 
voters’ information is an important determinant of policy preferences, and hence of the 
policies that ultimately get implemented by politicians.  
 
We are not the first to point out the role of information in shaping policy preferences on 
pension reforms. Boeri, Boersch-Supan and Tabellini (2001), (2002), drawing on 
surveys of European citizens, pointed to i) a systematic overestimation of benefits and   3
underestimation of costs of public pension systems and ii) a positive correlation 
between the support to reforms allowing for a partial privatisation of pension systems 
and a correct information about the net costs of social security.  Blinder and Krueger 
(2004) studied opinion polls in the US, and also noted that more informed individuals 
are more likely to support pension reforms. These papers, however, assumed that the 
attribute of being informed was exogenous, and did not fully investigate the possible 
joint determination of policy preferences over a variety of reform options and 
information acquisition.  
 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 illustrates the estimation strategy. The 
data are defined in section 3. Section 4 estimates the effect of information on policy 
opinions assuming that information is exogenous, using parametric and non-parametric 
(propensity score) methods. Section 5 relaxes the exogeneity assumption, and estimates 
a causal effect of information by means of instrumental variables and joint maximum 
likelihood methods. Section 6 discusses the role played by the media in learning about 
the true costs of pension systems. Section 7 summarizes and concludes.  
  
 
2. General estimation strategy 
 
Our goal is to estimate an equation of the following type: 
 
          Yi = F(Xi , Ii ) +  ei       (1) 
 
where Yi  is a binary variable that measures the policy opinions of individual i, Xi 
denotes his general attributes (such as age, education, gender, and so on), Ii   is a 
measure of how informed he is about the costs and the functioning of the pension 
system, and ei   is an unobserved error term. We are interested in the effect of 
information on policy preferences.  
 
We view information as determined by an equation of the following type:  
 
Ii = G(Xi , Zi ) +  ui       (2) 
 
where  Zi   is a set of additional observable individual features that determine the 
information possessed by each individual, and ui   is an unobserved determinant of 
information.  
 
Our first step is to assume that the error terms u and  e are uncorrelated, and that Zi is 
uncorrelated with both ei and ui. In this case, the model is recursive and we can treat 
information as exogenous in equation (1). We also check whether our estimates are 
robust to alternative assumptions about the functional form F(.). In particular, the effect 
of information on policy opinions could interact with other individual attributes, such as 
age or income. For instance, older vs young individuals have opposite economic 
interests on pensions, and so better information about the functioning of pension 
systems could induce opposite reactions in these two groups. To cope with this   4
problem, we also estimate (1) by means of non-parametric methods based on the 
propensity score.  These estimates assume again exogeneity of information, after 
conditioning on the variables in X, but allow the functional form F(.) to be totally 
unrestricted.   
 
Under additional assumptions, the recursivity assumption can be tested. We do it, and 
we reject it. This means that some unobserved individual features determine both the 
preferences and the information of individuals. Assuming exogeneity, in this case, 
would lead to biased estimates of the coefficients of interest. We cope with this problem 
in two ways.  
 
First, we allow e to be correlated with Z and u, but we assume that e and u are jointly 
normally distributed and that F(.) and G(.) are linear.  Under this functional form 
assumption, and measuring information (I) also as a binary variable, we can jointly 
estimate (1) and (2) by means of maximum likelihood methods. Here we achieve 
identification by making strong assumptions about the functional forms F(.) and G(.).  
 
Second, we achieve identification via exclusion restrictions.  In particular, we assume 
that the variables Z are uncorrelated with e, the error term of the policy opinions 
equation. Under this exclusion restriction, Z is a valid instrument for information, I, and 
we can estimate by instrumental variables by linearising equations (1) and (2).  
 
If both estimation methods give similar results, we are reassured that our inferences are 
robust. 
 
3. Data 
 
3.1 The survey 
 
The survey was carried out by Carlo Erminero & Co. in March 2004 over a 
representative samples of 1500 Italians aged 16 to  80 out by means of Computer 
Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI).  In addition to the standard set of socio-
economic background variables such as age, education, and income, the questionnaire 
included questions that elicited the information and the preferences about the current 
pension systems and potential reform options. The questionnaire is in Annex 4. 
Compared to existing surveys on the same issues, we do not ask open questions (“Do 
you want more benefits?”), but we posed specific trade-offs among specific policy 
options (“Are you willing to pay x% higher contributions in order to obtain y% higher 
benefits”). These type of questions are in the tradition of “contingent valuation”, and we 
use the “stated preference” questionnaire techniques described in Louviere, Hensher 
and Swait (2000).  
 
A common difficulty faced when asking about opinions is that answers to such 
questions are particularly prone to framing biases. For this reason, we tried to avoid 
suggestive formulations. Where we wanted to ascertain the individual’s answer on what 
is good for her or him, rather than on what she or he thinks is good for society at large,   5
we took great care in describing the applicable situation for the respondent and the 
corresponding offers in detail. Finally, we tried to avoid hypothetical situation bias by 
anchoring the answers around realistic numbers, e.g., pension benefit levels, and by 
varying potential answers by socio-economic situation, e.g., between employed and 
unemployed.  
 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of all the variables used in the paper. A precise 
definition of these variables is in Annex 3.  We now turn to a discussion of the main 
variables of interest.  
 
(insert Table 1 about here) 
 
3.2 Opinions on reforms 
 
Opinions on pension reform (the variable Y above) are summarized in a single variable. 
We exploit two questions eliciting opinions about hypothetical reforms that would 
reduce the size of the public pension system via an increase of the retirement age or a 
reduction of pension benefits (see Annex 4 for a precise formulation of the questions). 
The dummy variable shrink equals 1 if the respondent is either in favor of increasing 
the retirement age or of reducing pension benefits, independently of the answer 
provided to the other question.  Shrink takes the value zero instead if the respondent is 
strictly against one of the two reforms and does not approve the other. Shrink takes the 
value zero instead if the respondent is strictly against one of the two reforms and does 
not approve the other. Thus, we only focus on reforms that would reduce the size of 
pension expenditures, leaving aside pension reforms that increase social security 
contributions.  Inspection of the first line of Table 1 indicates that less than 40 per cent 
of the individuals taking a stance on these reforms was favorable to either cutting 
benefits or increasing retirement age, or both. 
 
About 50 individuals out of 1500 answer don’t know / no answer to both questions. 
These individuals are treated as randomly missing throughout. To check that this 
censoring does not induce selection bias, Annex 1 reports estimates of a model with 
censoring on the binary variable shrink, with a Heckman two step procedure that allows 
for non-randomly missing observations.   Annex 1 also estimates a multinomial logit 
specification, where the dependent variable can take three values (the third possible 
value being those that answer don’t know / no answer to both questions).  The results 
are similar to those displayed in Table 2 below.  
 
 
3.3 Information 
 
We measure information about individual and aggregate costs of pension systems (the 
variables I above) by means of several indicators.  
 
Info_deficit is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is aware of the fact that 
the pension system is in deficit (the sum of contributions is lower than the sum of all   6
pensions being paid) and zero otherwise. This variable is available for all respondents. 
As shown in Table 1, about 65% of the respondents know that the system is in deficit.  
 
Info_payg is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent understands that current 
pension benefits are paid out of social security contributions of currently working 
individuals, and zero otherwise. This question has only been asked to the respondent 
holding a job, and hence contributing to the public pension system at the time of the 
interview. Here, the data reveal more ignorance: about half of the respondents 
understand the basic functioning of a pay-as-you- go pension system. Such a low rate 
could also reflect a misunderstanding of the question, which however was quite 
straightforward (see Annex 4).  
 
Finally,  Info_rate is a dummy variable equal to one if  the respondent is aware of the 
percentage of her/his wage that goes to pay pension contributions, adding up the 
contributions paid by employer and employee (we chose a large interval, 25%-40%, 
around the correct answer of 32,7%). Only employees were asked this question.   
Despite the generous interval for a correct answer, only about 25% of respondents 
answer correctly according to our definition and less than 10% state that the 
contribution rate is in the 30 to 35% range.  Hence, there is huge misinformation about 
the true costs of public pensions
1.  Note that here respondents are only the employees, 
not the public at large; presumably employees are more informed about what they pay 
into the system, compared to individuals out of the labor force or unemployed.  Yet, 
more than one respondent out of two does not know the answer
2, another 12 per cent 
underestimates the true contribution rate while only about 4 per cent overestimates it.  
 
We also defined variables combining information on various dimensions.  In particular, 
the variable info2 is the sum of info_deficit and info_payg, and thus it measures the 
number of correct responses to the questions used to code these two variables. Finally, 
the variable info3 is the sum of info_deficit, info_payg and info_rate, and thus measures 
the number of correct responses referring to these three variables. Clearly, given the 
pattern of the survey, info2 and info3 could only be computed for employed and 
employees respectively.   
 
3.4 Other variables 
 
Throughout the analysis, we condition on several observable features of the respondent 
that are likely to influence his policy preferences (the variables X above), such as his 
education, age, gender, type of occupation, ideology, and so on. All these variables are 
defined precisely in Annex 3.   
                                                 
1 Jappelli, Padula and Bottazzi (2003) also found that Italians overestimate the level of benefits at 
retirement as they have not yet internalised the effects of the pension reforms of the 1990s. 
2 This is roughly the same percentage of “don’t know” answers which was obtained asking the same 
question in 2000 and 2001 to a representative sample of Italians.  Importantly, the percentage of 
individuals underestimating the contribution rate is increasing over time.  Thus, there is no indication that 
Italians are learning about the costs of their pension system.   
   7
 
Finally, as instruments for information (the variables Z above) we rely on a variable 
noclue, which counts how many times the respondent answered “I don’t know” to some 
other questions of the survey. Some of the questions used to construct noclue elicit 
opinions about the sustainability of the pension system, the desirable size of the welfare 
state and the way in which politicians, unions, experts and EU bureaucrats represent the 
interests of respondents; the remaining questions seek to capture knowledge of specific 
features of the welfare state. The variable noclue ranges from 0 to 13, with a mean of 2 
and a standard deviation of 2.2. See Annex 2 for a list of the relevant questions used to 
construct noclue. The results below are robust to a more restrictive definition of noclue, 
e.g., computed by considering only the set of positive questions on the features of the 
welfare state, or dropping subsets of the remaining questions.  As we shall see below, 
noclue is strongly correlated with the indicators of individual information. Moreover, 
after conditioning on other individual features, there is no strong a priori reason why 
this variable ought to be systematically correlated with unobserved determinants of 
attitudes in favor or against pension reforms. If so, it can be used as valid instrument for 
information. We further discuss the identification assumption in context, when 
commenting on the results. 
 
4  The model with exogenous information 
 
As stated above, we start by studying the determinants of opinions on pension reforms, 
assuming that the attribute of being informed is exogenous.  In terms of equations (1) 
and (2) in section 2, this amounts to assuming that the unobserved determinants of 
policy opinions and information (the error terms u  and e) are uncorrelated.  Hence, in 
this section we only report estimates to equation (1), neglecting equation (2). 
 
4.1 Parametric estimates 
Table 2 displays the probit estimates. The sample consists of all respondents in column 
1, of employed individuals in column 2, and of employees in column 3. The last three 
rows report the estimated coefficients of interest on the variables measuring 
information, namely info_deficit,  info2 and info3.  The remaining rows report the 
estimated coefficients of the other controls.  The estimated coefficients on the 
information variables are robust to alternative specifications of the set of controls.  
 
(insert Table 2 about here) 
 
Not many control variables have statistically significant estimated coefficients, perhaps 
because of multicollinearity.  Ideology plays an important role in shaping preferences: 
individuals with a right wing ideology (id_right) are more likely to favour pension 
reforms.  Those advocating a stronger role of trade unions in the pension reform debate 
(unioninfl) are more likely to oppose reforms, while those advocating a stronger role of 
experts (expertinfl) are more supportive.  Individuals belonging to households where the 
main income earner has middle to low occupational status (the variables bluecollar and 
whitecollar include clerical and unskilled workers, and exclude professionals and 
middle to high managers) are less likely to favour reforms.  Surprisingly, age does not   8
appear to be a significant determinant of policy preferences, perhaps because of 
collinearity with other variables (such as “Dini”, a dummy capturing the young 
generations involved in the less generous regime introduced with the Dini reform in 
1996). The pseudo R2 (the improvement in the likelihood associated with the inclusion 
of the covariates in addition to a constant) is larger when the sample includes only the 
employed persons.  
 
The important role of ideology in explaining policy opinions is consistent with the 
results of Blinder and Krueger (2004) for the US. Citizens’ opinions seem to reflect 
ideological stereotypes or prejudices about whom to trust (whether experts vs trade 
union leaders), rather than economic self-interest. The finding that age does not explain 
policy preferences on pensions is more surprising, however, and contradicts earlier 
findings by Boeri, Boersch-Supan and Tabellini (2001, 2002). 
 
The main result displayed in Table 2 is that information emerges as an important 
determinant of policy preferences. Better informed individuals are more likely to favour 
reforms, rather than to oppose them. As indicated by the dprobit coefficients reported 
for the three key variables of interest, knowledge of the fact that the pension system is 
in deficit increases the probability of being in favour of reforms in the reference group 
(non-employed middle-aged women with secondary educational attainments) by 8 per 
cent. Thus, information about sustainability, costs and functioning of social security has 
a non-neutral effect on policy opinions.
  
 
In interpreting this result, it is important to stress the content of information. Two out of 
three information variables refer to the costs (how much individuals pay into the 
system) or the sustainability of public pensions (whether the system is in deficit). As 
expected, individuals who are more ignorant about the costs or about the pension deficit 
are more likely to oppose reforms.
3 The third information variable reflects basic 
understanding of the pay-as-you-go system. A priori the effect of this variable could go 
either way. According to the estimates, individuals who confuse pay-as-you-go with a 
fully-funded system are also more likely to oppose reforms. Perhaps this can be 
interpreted as evidence that individuals who mistakenly believe that their pensions are 
paid out of their own past savings feel more entitled to receive higher compensations.  
 
Our definition of the variable Shrink  also raises a subtle issue. By construction, 
someone who approves of one of the two hypothetical reforms and replies don’t know / 
no answer to the second option is classified as in favor of reforms (Shrink  =1). 
Conversely, someone who rejects one reform and replies don’t know / no answer to the 
second one is classified as being against the reforms ((Shrink =0). It turns out that the 
distribution of don’t know /no answer is not symmetric around these two possible 
combinations. In our sample the pair “reject & don’t know” is more frequent than the 
pair “approve & don’t know”. This pattern could introduce a spurious correlation 
between lack of information and rejection of reforms. To cope with this problem, we 
                                                 
3 Note that we control for whether individuals expect an imminent crisis in the pension system (in Table 2 
the variable crisis has a positive but insignificant estimated coefficient). Thus, awareness of the deficit 
plays an important role in shaping public opinion, irrespective of whether they expect an imminent crisis.       9
have also redefined the variable Shrink excluding don’t know and no answers to either 
the question on retirement age or that on pensions; thus we have redefined Shrink =1 if 
the respondent approves both reform options, or approves one and rejects the other; and 
we have redefined Shrink = 0 if the respondent rejects both reforms. Now the number of 
missing observations increases from about 50 to about 200. To check that these missing 
individuals don’t create a selection bias, we have then re-estimated the model with a 
Heckman two-step procedure that allows for censored observations. The results 
(reported in Annex 1) confirm those reported in Table 2. 
 
Finally, a natural question is whether the effect of information varies with individual 
characteristics, such as age, education and ideology. A priori, knowledge about a 
redistributive program like pensions could have very different implications for policy 
preferences, depending on the individual situation. Table 2 already provides a first 
negative answer to this question. The estimated effect of information is very similar in 
the three columns of Table 2, that correspond to different categories of individuals: all 
adults, only employed individuals, and only employees in columns 1, 2 and 3 
respectively. We also interacted the information variables with several other controls. 
We found no significant and systematic pattern, suggesting that information affects 
policy preferences independently of individual characteristics.  Nevertheless, there is a 
limit to the kinds of interactions that can be imposed on the data parametrically. The 
next subsection thus discusses more general estimation methods.  
 
4.2 Matching estimates 
 
To relax linearity or other parametric functional forms, here we estimate the effect of 
information on policy opinions by means of semi-parametric methods. In this 
subsection we retain the assumption of exogeneity of information, or conditional 
independence as defined on the literature on the treatment effect: after conditioning on 
the variables discussed below, information is uncorrelated with other unobserved 
determinants of policy opinions.  
 
Since these non-parametric methods are not very efficient, and their small sample 
properties not well known, we confine attention to the full sample of almost 1500 
individuals. Information thus refers to knowing that the pension system is in deficit 
(info_deficit).  Policy opinions are measured by the dichotomous variable shrink, that 
disregards the don’t know / no answer to both reform dimensions.  
 
As a first step, we regress info_deficit on a set of control variables, estimating by probit 
an equation including all the covariates used in the estimation reported in Table 2. Our 
maintained assumption is that, after conditioning on these variables, information is 
exogenous with respect to policy opinions. 
 
Next, from this first stage estimation, we compute the predicted probability of being 
informed, for every individual in our sample. This predicted probability is called the 
“propensity score”.  It measures how likely each individual is of receiving the 
“treatment” of being informed.  Some of these individuals are actually informed (for   10
them info_deficit equals one), while others are not (info_deficit equals zero).  To reduce 
the role of outliers, we drop extreme observations, imposing the common support 
assumption.
4   This leaves us with 1445 observations.  Figure 1 illustrates the estimated 
propensity score for the remaining informed and uninformed individuals. The 
distribution is shifted to the right for the informed individuals, as it should be, but the 
probability mass is generally high over a large range of values for the propensity score.   
 
(insert Figure 1 about here) 
 
Our final step is to estimate the effect of information on policy opinions, by comparing 
the values of the dependent variable shrink for informed and uninformed individuals, 
but giving more weight to the comparison of individuals with similar propensity scores. 
This non-parametric method estimates the average treatment effect, and thus it is not 
directly comparable to the estimated coefficient of info_deficit reported in Table 2 
under the probit specification. Compared to the estimates reported in the next section, 
here we do not make any assumption about the second stage functional form.  
 
Table 3 reports the estimated coefficient of interest, for three alternative weighting 
methods: stratification, nearest neighbor matching with random draw, and nearest 
neighbor matching with equal weights.
5 The effect of information is positive and 
statistically significant, particularly with the stratification method. Overall, the 
matching estimates confirm that the positive average effect of information on 
willingness to reform is robust to any possible kind of interaction.  
 
(insert Table 3 about here) 
 
 
5.  Endogenous information gathering 
 
In this section we first test the exogeneity of the information gathering process.  Once 
established that we can reject it, we cope with joint determination of policy opinions 
and information in two ways: first, we estimate a joint model of  policy opinions and 
information by means of maximum-likelihood, assuming that both probabilities are 
distributed as a normal; second, we estimate a linear specification of policy opinions 
with instrumental variables for information.  
 
5.1 Is information exogenous? 
 
                                                 
4 That is, after ranking individuals based on their propensity score, we drop all uninformed individuals 
with propensity score higher than the first informed individual; and we drop all informed individuals with 
propensity score lower than the last uninformed individual.  
5 The stratification method divides the range of variation of the propensity score in intervals such that 
within each interval treated and control units have similar propensity scores.  The nearest neighbor 
method applies the same procedure but discards observations in blocks where controls are absent, by 
searching the control unit from the block with the closest propensity score. When weighted, this 
procedure allows to match treated units only with controls with nearest neighbors with a propensity score 
falling in a predefined range. See Becker and Ichino (2002).   11
The estimates presented in section 4 assume that we have a recursive model, and in 
particular that the residuals of the information gathering equation (2) are uncorrelated 
with those of the policy opinions equation (1). As explained in Wooldridge (2000), 
when dealing with binary  endogenous variables the exogeneity assumption can be 
tested by means of a simple two-steps procedure. First we run a linear regression of 
equation (2) and save the residuals ûi.  Next we estimate a probit model of Yi on Xi, Ii 
and ûi and we use the t-statistics on ûi as a test of the null hypothesis that information is 
exogenous. Importantly this test is valid without assuming normality or 
homoskedasticity of ui and can be applied even if Ii is a binary variable. 
 
These t-statistics are displayed in Table 4.  They all reject the exogeneity of information 
in the regression on policy opinions for all samples and measures of information.  The 
estimated coefficient of ûi (the variable resid in Table 4) is always negative, which 
implies that the correlation between the error terms of (1) and (2) is also negative. This 
in turn suggests that the estimated coefficients of the information variables reported in 
Tables 2 and 3, under the exogeneity assumption, are likely to be biased downwards. In 
other words, these estimated coefficients provide a lower bound for the effect of 
information on the willingness to reform. We now turn to methods to deal with this 
endogeneity problem. 
 
(insert Table 4 about here) 
 
 
5.2 Biprobit estimation 
 
Our first method to cope with the joint determination of information and policy 
opinions is to rely on functional form restrictions.  In particular, we jointly estimate 
equations (1) and (2) by maximum likelihood methods, exploiting the fact that we can 
measure both policy opinions and information as binary variables. Identification is 
achieved through a functional form assumption: we assume that the error terms in (1) 
and (2) are jointly normally distributed, and that the equations F(.) and G(.) are both 
linear.  
 
To estimate with probit, we need to measure information as a binary variable. Thus, in 
the sample of employed individuals and of employees, we replace the comprehensive 
variables  info2 and info3 with the binary variables info_payg and info_rate  (each 
available for different subsamples of respondents).  Rather than measuring the 
comprehensive impact of information, thus, these variables measure the effect of 
possessing specific bits of information. The correlogram of info_payg, info_rate, info2 
and info3 always displays positive and statistically significant coefficients, except in the 
case of the correlation between info_rate and info2.  
 
Table 5 reports the results. The information equation includes all the controls also 
included in the policy opinions equation, plus the variable noclue used as an instrument 
and thus excluded from the policy opinions equation (see the next subsection for a more 
extensive discussion of this variable). Once more, informed individuals are more likely   12
to favor reforms, and the effect of information is statistically significant. The 
coefficients are larger and the standard deviations smaller compared to the simple probit 
regression and the propensity score matching estimators, a further confirmation that the 
estimates that assume exogeneity are biased downwards.  Note that the estimated 
coefficient of the information variable is very similar in the three columns of Table 5, 
despite the different definitions of what information is about, and the different samples 
of respondents. This stability is a further sign of robustness.  
 
(insert Table 5 about here ) 
 
5.3 Instrumental variable estimation 
 
Despite the encouraging results reported in the previous subsection, the validity of the 
functional form restrictions reported in Table 5 remains open to doubt. Our second 
method to cope with the joint determination of information and policy opinions relies 
on an exclusion restriction.  As already anticipated, as an instrument for information we 
use the variable noclue
6, which reports the number of times the respondent answered 
don’t know / no answer to 13 questions about the desirability of alternative broad policy 
issues and reform options (other than the two questions on retirement age and the 
generosity of pension benefits that were used to construct our dependent variable, 
shrink). Thus, this variable measures how strongly held are the respondent’s opinions 
about other aspects of pension reforms: the higher the value of noclue, the less strongly 
held are his opinions. Again, this variable is neutral with respect to the desirability of 
reforms, and about whether they should take the form of higher contributions or of a 
less generous pension system.
7   
 
This variable is a valid instrument if it is uncorrelated with the error term of equation 
(1). In other words, our identifying assumption is that, after controlling for all the other 
individual attributes, this variable influences policy opinions only through its impact on 
information (as we measure it).  The validity of this identifying assumption cannot be 
tested.   
 
Panel 1 of Table 6 reports the first stage, where information is regressed on the full set 
of controls plus our instrument. We estimate a linear equation, to minimize the risk of 
specification error (Angrist and Krueger 2001). The variable noclue always has 
statistically significant estimated coefficients with the expected sign, in all samples and 
for all measures of information.  
 
(insert Table 6 about here) 
                                                 
6 We also tried as instruments other variables capturing the supply of information at the local level, such 
as the number of copies sold by economic newspapers in the different provinces, or the local turnout in 
national elections. None of these variables, however, turned out to be significantly correlated with 
information, as further discussed in section 6, perhaps because we could only draw on variation across 
provinces and our sample size (1,500 individuals) does not allow for small area representation.  
7  Recall that, by definition, the dependent variable shrink does not allow for don’t know / no answer to 
both options for pension reform; moreover, shrink is defined so that a don’t know / no answer to one 
policy option only can be associated both with shrink equal one and to shrink equal zero.   13
 
Panel 2 of Table 6 reports the second stage regression, also with a linear specification. 
Information has a positive and statistically significant effect in the willingness to accept 
reforms, confirming the results of the previous section. Note that, again, this applies to 
all definitions of information and to all samples of respondents (although here the 
estimated coefficients differ more across the three columns in Table 6). The estimated 
coefficients in Table 6 are not immediately comparable to those of Tables 2 and 5, 
because of the different functional form assumptions.  They are more comparable with 
the matching estimates displayed in Table 3, and they turn out to be much larger here, 
possibly because of the exogeneity assumption made by propensity score estimators. 
This is confirmed by estimating the second stage by OLS with a linear specification as 
in Table 6, but assuming that information is exogenous: the OLS estimate of the 
coefficients for information are smaller than the 2SLS estimates reported in the bottom 
panel of Table 6. This confirms the previous remarks, that joint endogeneity of 
information and policy opinions creates a downward bias in the estimated effect of 
information on the willingness to reform.   
 
6.  Involvement in public debate and information 
 
Overall, the estimates reported in the previous section are remarkably robust to the 
estimation method. They all confirm the presence of a significant effect of information 
on the willingness to accept pension reforms. But where does information come from, 
and how can its diffusion be increased? In this section we briefly address this issue. In 
particular, we ask whether more informed individuals have enjoyed a greater exposure 
to media coverage of pension issues.  
 
In the months preceding the interviews, there was extensive media coverage of pension 
issues, as the government announced its intention to carry out a new reform of the 
Italian pension system (which was then approved by Parliament in July 2004).  Two 
questions in the survey elicited the degree of involvement of respondents in this public 
debate. The first question asked: “during the last months did you read newspaper 
articles or watch TV programs concerning the pension reform debate?” - the variable 
involvement. A yes answer was reported by roughly two-thirds of respondents. The 
second question measured the degree of involvement, by classifying the level of 
attention to the debate in four categories (high, medium, low, none) – the variable 
attention.  Almost half the respondents reported a high to medium level of attention and 
another 35% a low level. Overall, these questions confirm a strong involvement of 
public opinion in the pension reform debate.   
 
Table 7 reports probit and propensity score matching estimates of the effects of 
involvement and attention on information about the financing (info_deficit), the 
functioning (info_payg) and the individual cost (info_rate) of the pension system. 
Throughout we assume a recursive model, with the variables involvement and attention 
assumed to be exogenous in the information equation (i.e. uncorrelated with the 
unobserved determinants of individual information). The Probit regressions (reported in 
the top panel) included, in addition to involvement and coverage, the same covariates   14
used in the first stage IV estimation discussed in section 5 above and a variable (press) 
capturing the number of copies sold by national newspapers per inhabitant in each 
province. The variables involvement and attention are never statististically significant, 
except for a mild role of attention when the focus is on the sample of employees and 
information refers to contributions paid (info_rate). Propensity score-matching 
estimates (confined to the effect of involvement on the info_deficit variable covering the 
full sample) also confirm that the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant - 
see the lower panel of Table 7.  Among the variables positively affecting info_deficit in 
the first-stage probit regression, we find expertinfl, which captures those willing to give 
a stronger role the experts in the pension reform debate.  As this variable also positively 
affects the support to pension reforms (see Section 4), it is likely to capture beliefs 
(experts are often favorable to reforms dealing with the ageing of population) more than 
neutral demand for information on these issues.  
 
(insert Table 7 about here) 
 
Overall, these last estimates suggest that the public debate has a low informational 
content. Individuals that declare to be more exposed to media coverage do not appear to 
be more informed about basic features of the pension system. One interpretation of this 
result is that individuals read newspaper articles or watch TV programs on the issue just 
to confirm their priors, more than to collect new information. Alternatively, our coding 
of individual involvement ad attention to the media could be measured with error.  
 
8. Concluding remarks 
 
The main result of this paper is the finding that more informed individuals are more 
willing to accept reforms that reduce the generosity of the pension system. The 
correlation between information and willingness to reform does not seem to reflect 
unobserved joint determinants of information and policy opinions. A variety of 
estimation methods under alternative identifying assumptions suggests that information 
has a causal effect on willingness to reform. The effect is not negligible. Our lower 
bound estimates (those assuming exogeneity of information) indicate that, for a middle-
aged woman located at the centre of a political spectrum, the probability of supporting 
reforms increases by 8 percent when they are informed that the pension system is in 
deficit. When we allow for joint endogeneity of information and policy opinions, the 
effect is much larger than that.  
 
This result has a simple but important policy implication. Pension reforms are 
politically very difficult. One reason why they are so difficult is also because of sheer 
ignorance by citizens at large about the costs, sustainability and basic functioning of the 
pension system. To create consensus in favor of reforms, governments ought to devote 
more effort to spread information about the consequences and costs of public pensions.  
 
The negative results about the effect of media exposure on information suggest that this 
task cannot just be delegated to the media, however. Governments ought to find better 
and more direct ways of spreading information. One such device would be for   15
governments to provide “pension statements” reporting to contributors their current 
entitlements.  In most European countries with unreformed pension systems – including 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain -- it is still extremely cumbersome to know the 
amount of individual contributions and to project future pension entitlements under a 
standard career profile and alternative retirement ages. In Sweden, by contrast, “orange 
envelopes” are mailed every year to all contributors, providing basic information on the 
functioning of the pension system, a glossary, a statement of past contributions and 
projections of the annual entitlements under three retirement ages and for two 
assumptions on economic growth.
8 Our results suggest that this practice could have 
beneficial effects. If the large countries of continental Europe were to follow the 
Swedish example, and if this indeed enabled citizens to become more informed about 
the features of their pension systems, the political feasibility of pension reforms could 
rise significantly.  
                                                 
8 According to a survey carried out in 2003 among a representative sample of contributors to the Swedish 
pension system (Sundén, 2003), almost everybody was aware of the envelope and about 2/3 of 
contributors opened and read at least part of the material.  Among the latter group, almost 7 out of 10 
looked at the benefit projection and 1 out of 4 compared the information in the orange envelope from one 
year to the next.     16
Table 1.  Summary statistics 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max  Median 
shrink  1443  0.376 0.484 0 1 0 
info_deficit  1500  0.655 0.475 0 1 1 
info_payg    779  0.524 0.500 0 1 1 
info_rate    627  0.268 0.443 0 1 0 
info2  779 1.240 0.719 0 2 1 
info3  627 1.496 0.843 0 3 2 
male  1500  0.469 0.499 0 1 0 
married  1500  0.722 0.448 0 1 1 
old  1500 0.31  0.463 0 1 0 
young  1500  0.219 0.413 0 1 0 
university  1500  0.154 0.361 0 1 0 
compulsory  1500  0.386 0.487 0 1 0 
children  1500  0.287 0.452 0 1 0 
pensioner  1500  0.224 0.417 0 1 0 
town  1500  0.531 0.499 0 1 1 
city  1500  0.257 0.437 0 1 0 
whitecollar  1500  0.235 0.424 0 1 0 
bluecollar  1500  0.117 0.322 0 1 0 
headpens  1500  0.366 0.482 0 1 0 
planearly  1500  0.134 0.341 0 1 0 
dini  1500  0.493 0.500 0 1 0 
id_left  1500  0.173 0.379 0 1 0 
id_right  1500  0.162 0.369 0 1 0 
crisis  1500  0.641 0.480 0 1 1 
involvement  1500  0.712 0.453 0 1 1 
attention  1500  2.623 0.898 1 4 3 
expertinfl  1500  0.316 0.465 0 1 0 
unioninfl  1500  0.515 0.499 0 1 1 
tradeunion  1500  0.278      0.448  0  1  0 
noclue 1500  2.004  2.208  0  13  1 
 
 
 
   17
Table 2. Probit regression 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Shrink  shrink  shrink 
male 0.30  0.27  0.13 
 (0.07)***  (0.10)***  (0.12) 
married -0.13  -0.22  -0.27 
 (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.15)* 
children -0.15  -0.11  -0.06 
 (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.14) 
young 0.03  0.11  0.11 
 (0.10)  (0.14)  (0.16) 
old -0.13  -0.21  -0.04 
 (0.13)  (0.19)  (0.21) 
university 0.18  0.11  0.19 
 (0.10)*  (0.13)  (0.15) 
compulsory 0.02  0.08  0.01 
 (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.14) 
pensioner 0.16     
 (0.14)     
whitecollar -0.31 -0.46 -0.15 
 (0.09)***  (0.12)***  (0.12) 
bluecollar -0.31  -0.48   
 (0.12)**  (0.15)***   
capopens 0.01  0.13  0.02 
 (0.10)  (0.15)  (0.16) 
planearly -0.16  -0.19  -0.15 
 (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.14) 
dini -0.02  -0.13  -0.16 
 (0.08)  (0.14)  (0.15) 
id_left -0.11  0.00  -0.03 
 (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.14) 
id_right 0.40  0.57  0.64 
  (0.10)*** (0.13)*** (0.15)*** 
crisis 0.10  0.11  0.07 
 (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.12) 
tradeunion 0.10 0.17 0.21 
 (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.12)* 
unioninfl -0.27  -0.35  -0.30 
  (0.07)*** (0.10)*** (0.11)*** 
expertinfl 0.20  0.27  0.29 
 (0.08)***  (0.11)**  (0.12)** 
info_deficit  0.21    
  (0.08)***    
  0.08
¤    
info2   0.16  
   (0.07)**  
    0.06
¤   
info3     0.12 
     (0.07)* 
     0.04
¤ 
Observations 1443  755  606 
Pseudo R2  0.06  0.10  0.07 
Notes:   Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
 
¤ marginal effect on reference group (dprobit estimation).   18
Table 3  Propensity score matching 
 
Outcome Treatment  Propensity score matching 
methods  Coeff t  test 
- Nearest neighbor matching 
method (random draw version) 
0.075       
(0.039)      
t = 1.942 
- Nearest neighbor matching 
method (equal weights version) 
0.077       
(0.038)     
t = 2.019  shrink
 
(sample: all)  info_deficit 
- Stratification method  0.082       
(0.026)      t = 3.182 
         Note:       Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4  Exogeneity test 
 
  All Employed  Employees 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Shrink
  shrink
  Shrink
 
info_deficit  5.00    
  (1.32)***    
info2   3.59   
   (0.91)***   
info3     2.99 
     (0.71)*** 
resid  -4.80 -3.46 -2.90 
  (1.32)*** (0.91)*** (0.72)*** 
Observations 1443  755 606 
Pseudo  R2  0.07 0.11 0.09 
Notes:         Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%.Not reported variables:  male, married, old, young, university, compulsory, children, 
pensioner (only for sample one), whitecollar, bluecollar (only for saple one and two), 
headpens, planearly, dini, id_left, id_right, crisis, expertinfl, tradeunion, unioninfl.   19
Table 5.  Maximum likelihood joint-probit estimation 
 
  All Employed  Employees 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 info_deficit  info_payg  info_rate 
noclue  -0.05 -0.08 -0.11 
  (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** 
Observations 1443  755  606 
  All Employed  Employees 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Shrink
  shrink
  shrink
 
info_deficit  1.50    
  (0.12)***    
info_payg   1.50   
    (0.09)***   
info_rate     1.65 
     (0.11)*** 
Observations 1443  755  606 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
Not reported variables:  male, married, old, young, university, compulsory, children, pensioner 
(only for sample one), town, city, whitecollar, bluecollar (only for saple one and two), headpens, 
planearly, dini, id_left, id_right, crisis, tradeunion, unioninfl, expertinfl 
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Table 6  Instrumental variables, linear regressions 
 
1st Stage:     
  All Employed  Employees 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Info_deficit  info2  info3 
noclue  -0.01 -0.04 -0.05   
  (0.006)** (0.016)** (0.021)** 
Observations 1443  755  606 
Test of excluded 
instruments 
5.06  
(Prob > F = 0.02) 
4.97  
(Prob > F = 0.03) 
6.61  
(Prob > F = 0.01) 
2nd Stage:     
  All Employed  Employees 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 shrink
  shrink
  shrink
 
info_deficit 1.73    
 (0.86)**     
info2   1.13  
   (0.56)**   
info3     0.88 
     (0.39)** 
Observations 1443  755  606 
Residual SS  1122.89             577.93            395.13             
Residual SS from OLS  311.07   152.85    120.26   
Notes:   Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%;  
Not reported variables:  male, married, old, young, university, compulsory, children, pensioner 
(only forsample one), whitecollar, bluecollar (only for sample one and two), headpens, 
planearly, dini, id_left, id_right, crisis, tradeunion, unioninfl, expertinfl. 
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Table 7 
 
Involvement in the public debate and information 
 
  Dependent variables 
  info_deficit 
(sample: all) 
info_payg 
(sample: 
employed) 
info_rate 
(sample: 
employees) 
Probit estimations:     
attention  0.04 0.00 0.16 
 (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.08)** 
involvement  0.02 0.16 0.08 
  (0.09) (0.12) (0.16) 
press 0.74  2.34  -0.49 
  (1.10) (1.48) (1.82) 
Observations 1500  779  627 
Pseudo  R2  0.06 0.02 0.07 
  Outcome: info_deficit (sample: all) 
  Coefficient t  test 
Propensity score matching:    
involvement (treatment):    
- Nearest Neighbor Matching 
method (random draw version) 
-0.007 
 (0.039)       
t = -0.168 
- Nearest Neighbor Matching 
method (equal weights version) 
-0.006        
(0.039) 
t = -0.160 
- Statification method  0.030        
(0.027)        
t = 1.083 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   22
Figure 1 
Propensity scores for the treated and controls  
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Annex 1 
 
As explained in section 3, our dependent variable shrink is missing for the 57 
individuals (out of 1500) that answered don’t / no answer to both  questions (on 
retirement age and on pension benefits). A more restrictive definition of shrink, 
excluding those individuals who answered don’t / no answer to either the question on 
retirement age or that on pension benefits is missing for 210 individuals. This annex 
reports alternative estimates, to make sure that non-random censoring is not a cause of 
selection bias.  
 
As a first check, we have re-estimated equation (1) with the dichotomous variable 
shrink as our dependent variable, treating information as exogenous, but with the two-
step Heckman procedure that allows for non-random censoring of observations.  The 
results are displayed in Tables A.1 and A.2, for the same specification as in Table 2 in 
the text. Table A1 refers to the definition of shrink used throughout the paper, where 
missing observations correspond to those that answered don’t know / no answer to both 
reform options. Table A2 refers to the alternative definition of shrink, where someone 
who answers don’t know /no answer to either reform option is treated as missing. The 
estimated coefficients of information in the second stage regression remain statistically 
significant in all samples and definitions of shrink, except among the employees only, 
although they are smaller than in the logit regression of Table 2.  This reassures us that 
the omission of these few agnostic individuals does not create a relevant selection bias.  
 
As a second robustness check, we have redefined the dependent variable shrink to also 
include as a third separate value the individuals who answer don’t know / no answer to 
both policy questions. Table A.3 displays multinomial logit estimates (i.e., responses 
are not ordered in any hierarchy). The comparison group is always those who oppose at 
least one reform (and do not strictly approve the other reform). Column (1) refers to 
those who are in favour of at least one reform (relative to the comparison group). 
Column 2 refers to those who answer don’t know /no answer to both questions (relative 
to the same comparison group). The sample consists of all respondents. Columns 3-4 
and 5-6 repeat the same estimation for the sample of employed individuals and 
employees respectively.   
 
The last three rows report the estimated coefficients of interest on the variables 
measuring information, namely info_deficit, info2 and info3.  The rows reporting the 
estimated coefficients of the other controls are omitted.  The estimated coefficients on 
the information variables are statistically significant and similar in value to those 
estimated on the binary definition of shrink and reported in Table 2 in the text.  
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Table A1.  Implications of omitting DN/NA answers to both reform options 
1
st Stage:     
  All Employed  Employees 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  dontknow dontknow dontknow 
Male 0.09  0.06  0.19 
 (0.14)  (0.20)  (0.24) 
Married 0.01  0.18  0.24 
 (0.19)  (0.26)  (0.29) 
Old 0.15  0.00  0.39 
 (0.22)  (0.38)  (0.48) 
Young 0.24  0.06  -0.01 
 (0.22)  (0.29)  (0.28) 
university 0.07  0.07  -0.00 
 (0.23)  (0.32)  (0.35) 
compulsory -0.06  -0.24  -0.22 
 (0.15)  (0.27)  (0.29) 
children 0.05  -0.04  -0.02 
 (0.17)  (0.24)  (0.26) 
pensioner -0.10     
 (0.24)     
whitecollar -0.14  -0.05  0.12 
 (0.19)  (0.26)  (0.24) 
bluecollar -0.40  -0.17   
 (0.21)*  (0.30)   
capopens  -0.14  -0.01 
  (0.18)  (0.28) 
planearly  0.29  0.04 
  (0.24)  (0.28) 
Dini -0.12  -0.04  0.13 
 (0.15)  (0.28)  (0.32) 
id_left 0.28  -0.06  0.37 
 (0.20)  (0.27)  (0.37) 
id_right -0.11  -0.00  -0.13 
 (0.19)  (0.30)  (0.33) 
Crisis   -0.33  -0.12 
   (0.24)  (0.27) 
tradeunion -0.09  -0.11  -0.09 
 (0.15)  (0.22)  (0.22) 
unioninfl -0.13  -0.20  -0.25 
 (0.14)  (0.22)  (0.24) 
expertinfl 0.06  -0.13  -0.23 
 (0.17)  (0.23)  (0.25) 
Noclue -0.17  -0.24  -0.28 
 (0.03)***  (0.05)***  (0.05)*** 
Observations 1500  779  627 
Censored  obs  57 24 21 
2
nd Stage:     
 All  Employed  Employees 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  shrink shrink shrink 
info_deficit 0.19     
 (0.07)***     
info2   0.13   
   (0.07)**   
Info     0.09 
     (0.06) 
Observations 1500  779  627 
Uncensored obs  1443  755  606 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A2.  Implications of omitting DN/NA answers to either increasing retirement 
age or reduce benefit options 
1
st Stage:    
  All Employed 
 (1)  (2) 
  dontknow dontknow 
male  0.11 0.06 
 (0.15)  (0.21) 
married 0.04  0.15 
 (0.20)  (0.26) 
old 0.13  -0.01 
 (0.23)  (0.39) 
young 0.27  0.02 
 (0.23)  (0.30) 
university 0.05  0.07 
 (0.24)  (0.33) 
compulsory -0.06  -0.29 
 (0.16)  (0.29) 
children 0.03  -0.03 
 (0.18)  (0.24) 
pensioner -0.17   
 (0.25)  
whitecollar -0.14  -0.05 
 (0.20)  (0.27) 
bluecollar -0.41  -0.13 
 (0.22)*  (0.32) 
capopens -0.14   
 (0.18)  
planearly 0.24   
 (0.25)  
dini -0.09  -0.02 
 (0.15)  (0.29) 
id_left 0.34  -0.04 
 (0.21)  (0.28) 
id_right -0.11  0.02 
 (0.19)  (0.31) 
crisis   -0.34 
   (0.25) 
tradeunion -0.09  -0.11 
 (0.16)  (0.22) 
unioninfl -0.12  -0.15 
 (0.15)  (0.22) 
expertinfl 0.03  -0.15 
 (0.17)  (0.24) 
noclue -0.19  -0.25 
 0.03***  (0.05)*** 
Observation 1290  691 
Censored obs  57  24 
2
nd Stage:    
 All  Employed 
 (1)  (2) 
 shrink
¤   shrink
¤ 
Infodeficit_dummy 0.16   
 (0.08)**  
info2   0.12 
   (0.07)* 
Observations 1290  691 
Uncensored obs  1233  667 
     
 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1 %.
(¤) Shrink here is     
defined omitting don’t know/no answer to either reducing pension benefits or increasing retirement age. 
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Table A.3  Multinomial logit 
Dependent variable: shrink 
Comparison group: against 
 All  Employed  Employees 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  in favour  don't know  in favour  don't know  in favour  don't know 
male  -0.50 -0.94 -0.45 -0.67 -0.21 -0.64 
  (0.12)*** (0.32)*** (0.17)***  (0.46)  (0.19)  (0.51) 
married 0.23 0.14 0.43  -0.19  0.51  -0.21 
 (0.16)  (0.42)  (0.22)*  (0.58)  (0.25)**  (0.61) 
young  -0.03 -0.49 -0.13 -0.48 -0.10 -0.13 
  (0.17) (0.47) (0.24) (0.65) (0.26) (0.72) 
old  0.24 -0.26 0.29 0.05 0.01 -1.09 
  (0.21) (0.50) (0.31) (0.87) (0.35) (1.13) 
university  -0.34 -0.62 -0.25 -0.73 -0.39 -0.53 
  (0.16)**  (0.57) (0.21) (0.82) (0.24) (0.83) 
compulsory  -0.04 0.38 -0.13 0.53 -0.04 0.75 
  (0.13) (0.33) (0.21) (0.53) (0.23) (0.54) 
children 0.24 -0.02 0.18 0.12 0.14 -0.05 
  (0.15) (0.39) (0.20) (0.55) (0.22) (0.60) 
pensioner  -0.31  -0.11      
  (0.23)  (0.53)      
town  -0.13 -0.16 -0.09 -0.35 0.03 -0.19 
  (0.15) (0.37) (0.21) (0.51) (0.23) (0.55) 
city  -0.29 -0.33 0.01 -1.50 0.15 -1.10 
  (0.17)* (0.43)  (0.24) (0.84)* (0.27)  (0.87) 
whitecollar  0.52 0.43 0.75 0.69 0.24  -0.11 
  (0.15)*** (0.44) (0.19)*** (0.60)  (0.19)  (0.50) 
bluecollar  0.48 1.09 0.78 1.19     
 (0.20)**  (0.45)**  (0.24)***  (0.64)*     
capopens 0.04  0.53  -0.13  0.04  0.10  0.18 
  (0.16) (0.38) (0.24) (0.59) (0.27) (0.61) 
planearly  0.29 -0.58 0.33 -0.32 0.26 -0.22 
  (0.18) (0.57) (0.21) (0.60) (0.23) (0.62) 
dini  -0.01 0.12 0.16 0.08 0.22 -0.25 
  (0.13) (0.32) (0.22) (0.60) (0.25) (0.65) 
id_left  0.27 -0.47 0.08 -0.21 0.09 -0.90 
  (0.16)* (0.47) (0.22) (0.61) (0.24) (0.79) 
id_right -0.69 -0.55 -0.98 -0.95 -1.08 -0.97 
  (0.15)*** (0.41) (0.21)*** (0.66) (0.24)*** (0.68) 
infodeficit  -0.39  -1.30      
  (0.12)***  (0.30)***      
info       -0.20  -0.61 
       (0.11)*  (0.30)** 
info2     -0.25  -0.57     
     (0.11)**  (0.30)*     
Observations  1500  1500 779 779 627 627 
Pseudo R2  0.0586  0.0790  0.0646 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Shrink here takes 
the value 1 if the respondent is in favour of either reform option, -1 if the respondent is strictly against one of the two 
reforms and does not approve the other and 0 otherwise. 
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Annex 2 
 
The questions used to define the variable “noclue”  
 
Questions 
Some people speak of a possible crisis in our public pension system. As a consequence, in 10/15 
years time we would not be able to keep public pensions at their current level. Do you agree with 
this opinion? 
1.  Yes, I agree 
2.  No, I don’t agree 
3. Refused 
4. Don’t  know 
Do you think that in the course of the next 10 years there will be another pension reform reducing 
significantly the amounts of public pensions? 
1.     Yes  
2.     No 
3.     Refused 
4.     Don’t know 
As you probably know, in Italy there were several pension reforms within the last years. Which of 
the following statements does in your opinion describe best the results of these pension reforms? 
The reforms… 
1.     Stabilized  the pension system: there’s no need for another reform 
2.     Were just a first step: new reforms are necessary 
3.     Did not succeed in stabilizing the system: a new reform will be soon necessary 
4.     Refused 
    5.      Don’t know 
According to you, the government should… 
1.  Reduce taxes and compulsory contributions and, at the same time, cut pensions, 
unemployment benefits, and social assistance 
2.  Maintain taxes and compulsory contributions, etc. at current levels 
3.  Increase pensions, unemployment benefits, social assistance, by raising taxes and 
compulsory contributions   
4. Refused 
5. Don’t  know 
According to you, the government should…   
1.  Allocate more resources to pensions and less to unemployed or young jobseekers 
2.  Allocate less resources to pensions and more to unemployed or young jobseekers 
3.  Let the situation unchanged 
4. Refused 
5. Don’t  know 
Currently women can retire earlier than men.  In light of the financial problems of public pension 
system, do you think it would be fair if they retired at the same age? 
1.  Yes, I think it would be fair 
2.  No, I think it wouldn’t be fair 
3. Refused 
4. Don’t  know 
The recent pension reforms put more emphasis on own provision for retirement, and less on the 
state. Do you think is fair? 
     1.    Yes 
     2.    No 
     3.    Refused 
     4.    Don’t know 
Do you think that private pension plans are a better deal than the cost public pension system, i.e., 
provide benefit per a higher pension benefit per $ contribution paid? 
1. Yes 
2. No   
3. Refused 
4. Don’t  know 
If older people would retire later, would this affect job opportunities for younger people? 
1.    Younger people would have less opportunities 
2.    Younger people would have the same opportunities 
3.    Younger people would have the same opportunities 
4.     Refused   29
5. Don’t  know 
Which of the following institutions does best represent your own interests in the pension reform 
debate? 
     1.    The Government 
     2.    The opposition 
     3.     Trade Union 
     4.     “Confindustria” 
     5.     Pension experts and commissions 
     6.     European Union 
     7.     Refused 
     8.     Don’t know 
Do you think the influence of the trade unions on the pension reform debate is today… 
6. Too  weak 
7. Right   
8. Too  strong 
9. Refused 
10. Don’t  know 
Do you think the influence of the pension experts and commissions on the pension reform debate 
is today… 
1.    Too weak 
2.     Right  
3.    Too strong 
4.     Refused 
     5.     Don’t know 
Do you think the influence of the EU on the pension reform debate is today… 
1.    Too weak 
2.     Right  
3.    Too strong 
4.     Refused 
     5.     Don’t know 
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Glossary of the key variables 
 
 
Variable Values  Description  Sample 
1  in favour of cutting pension benefits and/or increasing retirement 
age 
-1  against at least one policy option and not in favour of the other 
Shrink 
-  “don’t know” / “no answer” on both questions 
all 
1  the respondent is aware of the fact the pension system is in deficit  info_deficit 
0 otherwise 
all 
1  the interviewee knows that the public pension contributions are 
used only to pay pension benefits to current pensioner. 
info_payg 
0 otherwise 
employed 
1  the interviewee is aware of which percentage of his wage is used 
to pay pension contributions. 
info_rate 
0 otherwise 
employees 
2 both  infodeficit and infopayg are equal to one (the interviewee 
knew that both the pension system is in deficit and the public 
pension contributions are used only to pay pension benefits to 
current pensioner) 
1 either  infodeficit or infopayg are equal to one.  
info2 
0 both  infodeficit and infopayg are equal to zero (i.e. the interviewee 
gave the wrong answer to both questions). 
employed 
3  infodeficit, infopayg, infocostind are all equal to one (i.e. three 
correct answers about the pension system functioning). 
2  the respondent gave two correct answer out of three questions 
about the knowledge of the pension system. 
1  it takes value one if the interviewee give just one correct answer 
out of three. 
info3 
0  none of the answers is correct 
employees 
1 male  Male 
0 female 
all 
1  the interviewee is married or widowed    married 
0 otherwise   
1  the interviewee was born before 1949  Old 
0 otherwise 
all 
1  the interviewee was born after 1970  young 
0 otherwise 
all 
1  interviewee’ higher school degree is the university degree or more  university 
0 otherwise 
all 
  the interviewee has a compulsory school degree or less   compulsory 
 otherwise 
all 
1  the breadwinner has at least one child living in the household   children 
0  the breadwinner doesn’t have any children 
all 
1  the interviewee retired  pensioner 
0 otherwise 
all 
1  city dimension (number of citizens) up to 30 thousands  town 
0 otherwise 
all 
1  city dimension (number of citizens) more than 100 thousands  city 
0 otherwise 
all 
1  the interviewee is a whitecollar worker  whitecollar 
0 otherwise 
all 
bluecollar  1  the interviewee is a bluecollar worker  all   31
0 otherwise 
1  the breadwinner is a pensioner  headpens 
0 otherwise 
all 
1  the interviewee plans to retire before age of 60  planearly 
0 otherwise 
all 
1  concerned by the Dini pension system reform  dini 
0 otherwise 
all 
1  the interviewee defines his political position between 0 and 3 on a 
decimal left-right scale, where 0 represents extreme left and 10 
extreme right 
id_left 
0 otherwise 
all 
1  the interviewee defines his political position between 7 and 10 on a 
decimal left-right scale, where 0 represents extreme left and 10 
extreme right 
id_right 
0 otherwise 
all 
1  it is likely that will be a crisis of the pension system in a ten/fifteen 
years time 
crisis 
0 otherwise 
all 
1  the interviewee red newspaper, articles / watched TV programs 
concerning pension reform debate 
involvement 
0 otherwise 
all 
4  interviewee’ level of attention in following current pension debate is 
high 
3 medium 
2 low 
attention 
1 none 
all 
1  the influence of the pension experts and commissions on the 
pension reform is today too weak 
expert 
0 otherwise 
all 
1  the interviewee is a member of a tradeunion or he thinks that  the 
influence of unions on the pension reform is today too weak (or 
both) 
union 
0 otherwise 
 
noclue  from 0 to 
13 
how many times an interviewee answered “I don’t know” the 
questions of the survey. The questions on pension reforms are not 
included 
all 
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Annex 4 
 
Sample questions of questionnaire 
 
Issues  Questions Variables 
Are you in favour of increasing retirement age? 
1.  I’m in favour 
2. I’m  against 
3.  I don’t know 
shrink  Opinions on pension 
reforms 
Are you in favour of reducing pension benefits? 
1.  I’m in favour 
2. I’m  against 
3.  I don’t know 
shrink 
Given all the contributions paid by employees and employers, and all the 
pension benefits paid to current pensioners, do you think that our public 
pension system is… 
5.  balanced (the sum of all the contributions is equal to the total 
expenditure for paying pension benefits), 
6.  in surplus (the sum of all the contributions is lager than the total 
expenditure for paying pension benefits, allowing to save 
resources for the future), 
7.  in deficit (the sum of all the contributions is lager than the total 
expenditure for paying pension benefits, requiring to use 
additional taxes to finance public pension system) 
8. refused 
9.  I don’t know 
info_deficit 
According to you, for which purpose are these contributions used for?, 
6.  only to pay your own future pension, 
7.  only to pay pension benefits to current pensioners, 
8.  to pay both your own future pension and current pensions, 
9. refused 
10.  I don’t know 
info_payg 
Informazion about 
the costs and 
functioning of the 
Italian pension 
system 
As you probably know, in Italy both employees and employers pay public 
pension contribution. Which percentage of your wage is used to pay 
pension scheme contributions? (take in account also the contribution paid 
by your employer), 
less than 10% 
6.  10% - 15%  
7.  15% - 20%  
8.  20% - 25%  
9.  25% - 30%  
10.  30% - 35%  
11.  35% - 40%  
12.  more than 40% 
13. refused 
14.  I don’t know 
info_rate 
Which was your level of attention in following current pension reform 
debate? 
5. high 
6. medium 
7. low 
8. none 
attention  Involvement in public 
debate and 
information 
During the last months, have you read newspaper articles/watched TV 
programs concerning pension reform debate?, 
1. yes 
2. no 
involvement 
 
 
 